Water Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 38

1-1-2011

Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010)
John Lahner

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
John Lahner, Court Report, Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010), 14 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 467 (2011).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

467

Group's takings claim.
Next, the court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the
Group's negligence claim, and the City owed the Group a duty of care
with regard to the method the City used to divert water pursuant to its
established water rights. The court further held that the City's
continued negligence was a natural extension of the continuing tort
doctrine and, therefore, tolled the statute of limitations. In addition,
the lawful appropriation of the water right did not relieve the City of
its obligation to exercise care in obtaining its water. Accordingly, the
court found that the City owed a duty of reasonable care to the Group.
Finally, the court elaborated on the Group's recommendation that
the City use the alternative confined aquifer instead of the unconfined
aquifer. It noted that, if viable, the Group could prevail on its
negligence claim and it would be unreasonable for the City not to
implement the change.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment with regard to the Group's takings and
interference claims, reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment with regard to the Group's negligence claim, and remanded
for further proceedings.
Kelly Miller

WASHINGTON
Lummi Indian Nation v. State, .241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010)
(holding that statutory amendments to the state's water law act that
alter the requirements for private water rights to vest do not facially
violate due process or separation of powers).
To acquire water rights in Washington, a prospective user first
must submit an application specifying a proposed beneficial use to the
If the Department
Department of Ecology ("Department").
determines the proposed use is beneficial and water is available, it
issues a permit that quantifies the user's water right and identifies all
permitted uses. This permit represents a conditional right that is
perfected when the user applies the water to its designated beneficial
use. If the user perfects the right with reasonable diligence, the
Department issues a certificate relating back to the time of application.
Since the 1950s, the Department and its predecessor quantified
numerous certificates based on need and capacity rather than actual
beneficial use, contrary to case law. In 1998, the Washington Supreme
Court held in Departmentof Ecology v. Theodoratus that new private water
rights do not fully vest until the water is put towards an actual
beneficial use, not when the capacity to use the water was built. The
court held that because the private developer in that case was not a
municipal water supplier, his conditional water use permit should be
quantified based on actual beneficial use, not capacity. The court
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made clear that Theodoratus applied only to private water rights and did
not extend to municipal water rights.
In 2003, in order to calm concerns in the wake of Theodoratus
about current municipal water rights based on capacity, the legislature
significantly amended the water law act ("2003 amendments"). In
2006, two groups of challengers argued that various sections of the
2003 amendments were unconstitutional. The trial court consolidated
these cases and agreed that the challenged amendments violated
separation of powers. The trial court did not address the substantive
due process challenge to the provisions and rejected the facial
procedural and substantive due process challenges. The court granted
review on the motion of all parties.
Lummi Indian Nation made two facial separation of powers
challenges to the 2003 amendments. It contended that the definition
in the 2003 amendments of municipal water suppliers including
private developers whose projects include more than fifteen houses
violates separation of powers by overturning Theodoratus. According to
Lummi Indian Nation, this definition is broad enough to include the
private developer in that case. Lummi Indian Nation also contended
that an amendment declaring certificates issued to municipal water
suppliers under the capacity standard were in good standing also
violated separation of powers. Lummi Indian Nation argued that this
amendment vested water rights in municipalities that would not have
vested under Theodoratus. The trial court held that the amendments
violated separation of powers by making a legislative determination of
adjudicative facts relating to the 'good standing' of certain water
rights.
To resolve the separation of powers question, the court had to
determine if the actions of one branch interfered with or undermined
another branch. In general, the legislature violates separation of
powers whenever it adjudicates facts and makes a legal conclusion. For
example, retroactive legislation that interferes with vested rights
established by judicial rulings may violate separation of powers. Under
this standard, however, the court found no facial violation of
separation of powers created by these amendments. The court
overruled the trial court and held that the legislature did not
adjudicate facts. Rather, the court held that the amendment simply
confirmed that the water certificates issued under the pipe and pump
standard before Theodoratus continued to be valid and that Theodoratus
did not divest any rights.
Lummi Indian Nation also made several facial due process
challenges to the 2003 amendments. One of these challenges was
based on a likely detrimental effect on any junior water rights holder
whose rights vested between Theodoratus and the 2003 amendments.
Lummi Indian Nation claimed that the 2003 amendments improperly
expanded water rights held by municipalities by "resurrecting"
certificates issued before Theodoratusbased on capacity.
The court recognized that vested water rights cannot be deprived
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without due process of law. However, the court also noted that junior
water rights holders take their water subject to senior rights.
Therefore, junior water rights holders are subject to the risk there will
not be enough water to fulfill their rights. The court held that the
amendments did not facially violate due process despite the increased
probability of injury to a group of hypothetical water rights holders.
Lummi Indian Nation also contended that one of the 2003
amendments was facially unconstitutional because it allowed for
municipal water users to change the place of use with approval from
the Department of Health or local legislative body. The Department
of Ecology must approve changes in place of use for non-municipal
users. Lummi Indian Nation argued that this might allow municipal
users to change their place of use to the detriment of other water
rights holders without. proper notice or an opportunity to comment.
However, the court rejected this argument because it felt Washington
law provides those who hold water rights sufficient process. The court
reasoned that any impact on the rights of others would be collateral
and indirect, that the provision applies prospectively, and that it would
deal with any injuries on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, Lummi Indian Nation argued that two of the amendments
allowing municipalities to increase the population served did not
provide other water rights holders sufficient notice and an opportunity
to comment. The court held that these provisions do not violate due
process because they only apply to future applications and integrate
the provisions into the current regulatory system. Furthermore,
municipalities were never limited to a maximum number of clients
prior to the 2003 amendments, and their plans are reviewable by the
Department of Health.
The court overruled the trial court's determination that the
amendments violated separation of powers because they overruled
Theodoratus and affirmed the rejection of the other constitutional
challenges. However, the court emphasized its ruling on these facial
challenges does not foreclose an as applied challenge in the future.
John Lahner

